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THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS AND




In many legal systems today, it is remarkably difficult to disentagle ad-
ministrative law from the whole legal and constitutional background to
governmental action, although this task is somewhat easier in those legal
systems which, as in France, have a distinct administrative jurisdiction. The
close inter-relation of constitutional and administrative law is one of the
themes of this article. In 1968 at an international symposium, "Judicial pro-
tection against the Executive", held in Heidelberg, the President of the Ger-
man Constitutional Court, Gerhard Muller, defined the constitutional State as
"a State in which the system of government is at least in principle, understood
as a system ruled by law" and continued: "The most important elements of
the constitutional State are the subjection of the supreme power to the law, the
separation of powers and the respect for the general, fundamental rights of
man." 1 In Muller's view, the subjection of the supreme power to the law was
closely linked with the legitimation of judicial power; the separation of powers
was presupposed when courts granted judicial protection against the Ex-
ecutive; and respect for fundamental human rights was the ultimate justifica-
tion for the exercise of the supreme power.
In a recent article reviewing the two leading text books on English ad-
ministrative law2 D.J. GaUigan draws attention to the present perplexing state
of the subject in Britain. He distinguishes two senses of administrative law,
one referring to "a body of legal principles, created by the courts on the basis
of tradition and constitutional understandings, and having common applica-
tion to all areas of government activity," the other referring to the law and
practice in specific branches of state regulation (welfare, planning, immigra-
tion and so on). 3 Adopting the former sense, Galligan suggests that a mixture
of gloom and optimism is most pertinent. He offers a critique both of Wade's
Administrative Law, "judicial discretion resting on a shaky theoretical basis,
and in danger of being particularistic and unprincipled in practice.., and
© Copyright, 1983, A.W. Bradley.
**Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Edinburgh.
'Muller, 3 Judicial Protection Against the Executive, ed. Mosler (New York:
Oceana Publications Inc., 1971).
2 Galligan, Judicial Review and the Textbook Writers (1982), 2 Ox. J1. of Legal
Studies 257, reviewing Wade, Administrative Law (4th ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1977); and Smith, JudicialReview ofAdministrative Action (4th ed. London: Stevens &
Sons Ltd., 1980).
3 Galligan, supra note 2, at 258.
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overly simple framework," ' 4 and, in more respectful terms, of de Smith's ap-
proach in Judical Review of Administrative Action: "the conflict between
these two themes, the attempt to formulate general rules and the ubiquitous
discretion of the courts, runs throughout de Smith and is never resolved." 5
Galligan argues that the organizing theme for administrative law should be the
requirement of rational decision-making and reasoned decisions. He concludes
that administrative law "is not a self-contained discipline; it is one of many
sub-systems trying to make sense of modern societies."
6
This last comment would find support from Professor McAuslan, whose
own pithy critique of British literature on administrative law was entitled, Ad-
ministrative Law and Administrative Theory: the Dismal Performance of Ad-
ministrative Lawyers.7 McAuslan was concerned with the failure of ad-
ministrative lawyers to discuss fundamental questions about the role that law
might play in the relationships between the institutions of the state and society.
There are welcome signs that other teachers of administrative law in Britain
share the same impatience. 8 To give point to McAuslan's concern, the House
of Lords, under Lord Diplock's inspiration, appears to be laying the basis for
the rediscovery of public law, without waiting for academic theories to
emerge.
9
Now it may be desirable to place the blame for this situation on the ad-
ministrative lawyers themselves, but one explanation of the unsatisfactory
theoretical state of administrative law is to be found in the constitutional
background of the United Kingdom. The orthodox constitutional doctrine of
the legislative supremacy of Parliament, together with the prevailing political
framework, makes it difficult for the British to understand, in Muller's words,
how the supreme power may be considered to be subject to the law. (Muller
surely was referring to the supreme power in the state whether exercised by
legislative or executive action.) The function of judicial review is not satisfac-
torily explained by reference to the subordinate role of the courts and the task
of statutory interpretation, as British writers are inclined to suggest. 10 A more
open approach is strongly to be preferred: in Galligan's words, ". . . the
primary source of principles of good administration lies beyond Parliament,
and their justification depends on values in the constitutional order that
4 Id. at 267.
5 Id. at 269.
6 Id. at 276.
7(1978), 9 Cam. L. Rev. 40. And see McAuslan, Administrative Law, Collective
Consumption and Judicial Policy (1983), 46M.L.R. 1.
8 Prosser, Towards a CriticalPublic Law (1982), 9 J1. of Law and Society 1.
9 The decisions include Anns v. Merton B.C., [1978] A.C. 728; Town Investments
Ltd. v. Department of the Environment, [1978] A.C. 359; Gouriet v. A.-G., [1978]
A.C. 435; R. v. Inland Revenue Commssrs., ex p. National Federation of Self-
Employed, [1982] A.C. 617; O'Reilly v. Mackman, [1982] 3 All E.R. 1124; Cocks v.
Thanet D.C., [1982] 3 All: E.R. 1135. See also Garner, Public Law andPrivate Law,
[1978] P.L. 230; Harlow, "Public" and "Private" Law: Definition Without Distinc-
tion, [1980] 43 M.L.R. 241; Cane, Standing Legality and the Limits of Public Law,
[1981] P.L. 322; and Samuel, Public and Private Law: a private lawyer's response
(1983), 46 M.L.R. 558.
10 See Wade, Administrative Law (5th ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) at 28-29.
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precede the doctrine of sovereignty." Yet this broader view is not universally
held. Indeed, the British constitutional framework is vulnerable to those who
see no value in the distribution of powers, and prone to the proliferation of in-
finitely variable arrangements for rule-making and the administrative process.
Agencies and procedures are listed seriatim before they can be subjected to ap-
propriate controls: it is in this way that the spheres of operation of the
Parliamentary Ombudsman, the Council on Tribunals and the Statutory In-
struments Act 1946 are determined. 12 The debilitating effects of reliance on
such means of categorizing institutions is seen when the normal props for a
decision are absent, as in the unimpressive reasoning of the House of Lords in
deciding whether contempt of court applied to an administrative tribunal
which the legislation described as a court.
13
Administrative law in Britain at present is in a perplexing state: there is
much judicial activity founded upon a shifting base, lacking an adequate ra-
tionale and having an uncertain content. If in this situation it is difficult to ar-
ticulate the principle that the supreme power is subject to the law, and it is left
to others to debate the separation of powers, what of the third essential in
President Muller's description of the constitutional State, respect for fun-
damental human rights?
II. RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS
Respect for fundamental human rights can take many forms and there is
no particular correlation between formal constitutional propositions and the
actual practice of governments. The British tradition has avoided the solemn
enactment of human rights, and has preferred that the individual's liberties
and freedoms should be preserved in less obvious but possibly more effective
ways. The majority report of the Royal Commission on the Constitution
devoted three pages out of nearly 600 to the protection of human rights, reject-
ing proposals that were made to the Commission (particularly in evidence
from Northern Ireland) for accompanying the grant of subordinate legislative
powers with guarantees for human rights. The report said: "there is no
evidence that the public conscience, as made effective through our existing
democratic institutions, is not adequate to provide the protection called
for.' 14 The Commission's report was published in October 1973. Fourteen
months later came Sir Leslie Scarman's Hamlyn lectures, English Law - the
New Dimension. Scarman passionately asserted the contrary, calling for the
power of the legislature to be curbed in order that the concept of fundamental
and inviolable human rights might be accommodated within the national legal
system. These lectures included a somewhat unspecific plea for reform in ad-
ministrative law, but in the ensuing debate it was the constitutional protection
IIGalligan, supra note 2, at 262.
12 Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1971, c. 62, s. l(1)(a) and s. 15(1); Parliamentary
Commissioner Act 1967, c. 13, s. 4; Statutory Instruments Act 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6,
c. 36, s. 1(1).
13A.-G. v. B.B.C., [1981] A.C. 303.
14 Royal Commission on Constitution (Cmnd. 5460, 1973) at 231; Lester, Fun-
damental Rights in the United Kingdom: The Law and the British Constitution (1976),
125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 337 at 345.
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of human rights that dominated the arguments. 15 As the debate progressed,
those who wished to see constitutional reform came to agree that the most
pressing need was a new Bill of Rights. In 1978, a select committee of the
House of Lords was "irreconcilably" divided on whether a Bill of Rights was
desirable, but was unanimous that if there were to be a Bill of Rights it should
be a Bill incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights into the
domestic law of the United Kingdom. 16 In 1980, on the proposal of a Liberal
peer, Lord Wade, the House of Lords gave third reading to such a Bill. 17 The
Conservative government, however, has no intention of allowing this initiative
to make progress in the Commons.
Recent British discussion about incorporation of the European Conven-
tion has concentrated on the problems set for orthodox constitutional doctrine
by proposals for enacting a Bill of Rights. Thus, having been advised in this
sense by Lords Diplock, Scarman and Wilberforce (Lord Hailsham
dubitante), the House of Lords committee concluded that there was no way in
which a Bill of Rights could protect itself from encroachment, whether express
or implied, by later Acts. 18 The committee gave little consideration to the
detailed effects which incorporation might have on the domestic law. Indeed,
the committee reported the government's view that it had no reason to suppose
that there was a conflict between any of the provisions of the Convention and
the law of the United Kingdom or the general rules governing administrative
practice in this country. 19 The committee considered that there were "no more
than a few marginal situations" (mainly relating to privacy and the prison ser-
vices) where the incorporation of the Convention might bestow a remedy
where the present law did not. 20 The committee also mentioned two aspects of
remedies that might cause problems (the availability of damages for a breach
of the Bill of Rights, and the granting of injunctions against the Crown), but
the committee did not review the implications for administrative law of incor-
porating the European Convention. 21
15 The literature includes Zander, A Bill of Rights? (London: Barry Rose, 1975);
Home Office, Legislation on Human Rights: A Discussion Document (London:
H.M.S.O., 1976); Report of Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, The
Protection of Human Rights by Law in Northern Ireland (London: H.M.S.O., 1977),
Cmnd. 7009; Walllngton and McBride, Civil Liberties and a Bill of Rights (London:
Cobden Trust, 1976); Campbell, ed., Do we need a Bill of Rights? (London: Temple
Smith, 1980); Hewitt, TheAbuse of Power (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982), ch. 10.
16Report of Select Committee on a Bill of Rights (London: H.M.S.O., 1978),
House of Lords paper 176.
17The Bill provided that the Convention should have the force of law and be en-
forceable by action in U.K. courts (cl. 1); that the provisions of the Convention should
prevail in any conflict with any laws enacted before the passing of the Bill of Rights
(cl. 2); that in case of conflict between the Convention and subsequent enactments, the
enactments should be deemed subject to the Convention and should be so construed
unless the enactment provided otherwise or the enactment admitted of no compatible
construction (cl. 3); and that the Queen in Council could in time of emergency take
measures derogating from the Convention (without this affecting international obliga-
tion) (cl. 4).
18 Supra note 16, at 26.
19 House of Lords debates, vol. 389, col. 1966 (23 March 1978).
20Supra note 16, at 33.
2 1 Nor does Dr. Jaconelli's scholarly study of the problems of enacting a Bill of
Rights consider the effects for administrative law, although he mentions in passing
points of comparison between judicial review of administrative action and the enforce-
ment of a Bill of Rights, Jaconelli, Enacting a Bill of Rights, The Legal Problems (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1980).
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The importance of fundamental constitutional questions is often more
theoretical than practical (but not always, as the recent history of Canada
testifies). Speculative attempts to answer the 64-dollar question ought not to
mean that the day-to-day practical consequences of legal change should pass
unnoticed. As Professor Tarnopolsky commented, in reviewing Dr. Jaconelli's
book, "for most of the time the important issue concerning a Bill of Rights is
not whether it will provide authority for judicial review of legislative action,
but rather whether it will induce the judiciary to review and restrain ad-
ministrative action." ' Without pausing to consider whether the conclusions
of the House of Lords select committee on the impossibility of entrenchment
are justified, this article will examine whether experience of the European
Convention provides any support for Professor Tarnopolsky's comment, and
will draw some parallels between that experience and domestic administrative
law. Any conclusions that are reached will be tentative; indeed the
jurisprudence of the European Court and Commission, after a slow and
cautious start, is now in a period of rapid development and extension. The ad-
ministrative law dimension of the Convention is not stressed in the standard
accounts in English of the Convention, 23 but much benefit may be derived
from the work of Professor Harris and also that of Mr. Alan Boyle.
24
III. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION - A BARE OUTLINE
The Convention is concerned with the relationship between the individual
and state power, as is administrative law. It was intended to promote the
observance of human rights by European governments having "a common
heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law."' 25 The
Convention does not cover the whole field of human rights, most social and
economic rights being excluded. Its enforcement machinery consists essentially
of the European Commission of Human Rights (hereafter the Commission),
responsible for receiving and inquiring into alleged breaches of the Conven-
tion; the European Court of Human Rights (hereafter the Court), which
decides judicially whether breaches have occurred, and whether "just satisfac-
tion" should be offered to the injured parties; and the Committee of
Ministers, which as a political body may deal finally with reports from the
Commission that are not referred to the Court, and which also supervises the
execution of judgments given by the Court. Complaints of breaches of the
Convention may be made against a party state either by another state or,
where a state has recognised the competence of the Commission to receive such
petitions, by an individual or non-governmental organization claiming to be a
victim of a violation of the guaranteed rights. The Court has jurisdiction
22Tarnopolsky, Enacting a Bill of Rights: The Legal Problems (1982), 2 Ox. J1. of
Leg. Studies 122 at 125.
2 Fawcett, Application of the European Commission on Human Rights (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1969); Jacobs, The European Commission on Human Rights (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1975); Castberg, The European Commission on Human Rights
(Dobbsferry, N.Y.: Oceana Press, 1974); Beddard, Human Rights in Europe (London:
Sweet and Maxwell, Publishers, 1973).
24 Harris, The Application of Article 6(l) of the European Convention on Human
Rights to Administrative Law (1974-1975), 47 B.Y.I.L. 157 and The Effect of the Incor-
poration of the European Commission on Human Rights into our Law (unpublished,
submitted to Justice/All Souls Review Committee on Administrative Law, 1981);
Boyle, Administrative Law and the European Committee on Human Rights, [1982]
P.L. 218.
25 Preamble to the Convention.
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where the state concerned has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court or consented to a particular case coming to the Court. The individual
petitioner has no right to refer a case to the Court: this may be done only by
the Commission or a state. However, by amended rules of procedure, which
came into effect in January 1983, the individual may be directly represented in
proceedings before the Court.
The status of the Convention in the United Kindgom is that of a treaty,
entered into by the Crown. Executive declarations accepting the right of in-
dividual petition to the Commission and the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court have been maintained in force since 1966, but no British government has
accepted that the Convention should be incorporated into the law of the
United Kingdom. Courts may take account of the Convention in interpreting
ambiguous legislation enacted since Britain ratified the Convention 26 and for
assistance in resolving uncertainties in the common law.27 But the Convention
is not part of the law of the United Kindgom and does not create rights that
can be relied on in British courts. 2
8
Party states have undertaken to secure to everyone within their jurisdic-
tion the rights protected by the Convention 29 and those whose rights are
violated are entitled to an effective remedy before a national authority. 30 In
many states (as in the Netherlands and Austria) the domestic courts may en-
force the Convention directly, but the Court has held that the Convention lays
down for states no given manner for ensuring effective implementation within
their internal law of any provision of the Convention. 3' In 1978 the United
Kingdom was the only signatory which neither had its own constitutional
charter of human rights nor had incorporated the Convention into domestic
law. 32 Successive British governments have taken the view that the domestic
law of the United Kingdom conforms to the Convention. As human rights
were understood in 1950, this may have been the case; but the Court has stress-
ed that the Convention must be interpreted in the light of present-day condi-
tions, and has applied evolving notions of human rights. 33 In the light of cases
from the United Kingdom which have gone to Strasbourg since 1966, there is
today no room for any British complacency. These cases have had a direct im-
pact on legislation and administrative policies, in regard to such matters as im-
migration appeals, contempt of court, the prison system and mental health.
IV. STATE RESPONSIBILITY, RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL CONTROL
The concept of the state in the public law of Britain is not well developed.
The state as such is not a legal entity. The legal structure of government is
26 R. v. Miah, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 683; R. v. Home Secretary, ex p. Salamat Bibi,
[1976] Q.B. 606; cf. Ahmad v. Inner London Educational Authority, [1978] Q.B. 36
(dissent of Scarman L.J.).
27Malone v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, [1979] Ch. 344 at 365-66.
281d.; Surfit Kaur v. Lord Advocate, [1979] S.L.T. 322, discussed by Finnie, The
European Convention on Human Rights (1980), 25 J1. of Law Soc. of Scotland 434.29 Art. 1, European Convention on Human Rights.
30 Art. 13, European Convention on Human Rights.
31 Swedish Engine Drivers' Union v. Sweden (1976), 1 E.H.R.R. 617 at 631.
32 Supra note 16, at 30.
33See, e.g., Maickx v. Belgium (1979), 2 E.H.R.R. 330.
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Byzantine rather than monolithic. A formal separation of powers is not
observed, but one function of public law is to differentiate the various institu-
tions of government. In reviewing executive acts, the courts frequently need to
define the powers of ministers, departments, local authorities and so on. 34 In
such demarcation disputes, "the typical questions in issue are whether the
deciding authority is properly constituted, whether it embarks on the right
tasks, satisfies any conditions, and finally comes to a decision within the scope
of its authority." 35 Are such demarcation disputes a feature of proceedings
under the Convention?
Although individuals enjoy rights of access under the Convention, only
states are parties to it, and all applications must be directed against one or
more of the party states. State responsibility under the Convention applies
broadly to the acts of all public authorities within the state, including the
legislature, government departments, the courts, police and other agencies.
The lack of direct executive control over a particular body provides no defence
to a finding that individual rights have been violated, hor does the fact that the
action in question was in accordance with national law. (However, as will be
considered below, it is a necessary condition of many limitations of protected
rights that they are imposed in accordance with the law.) Proceedings under
the Convention may bring under examination not merely the ill-treatment of
an individual but a whole area of legislative, executive or judicial policy. In-
deed, incorporation of the Convention has been attacked for the very reason
that this would mean entrusting to the judiciary wide areas of legislative
policy. 36 State responsibility as such is not new in international relations: what
is novel about the Convention is that once a state has accepted the right of in-
dividual petition, the machinery for enforcing the Convention can be set in
motion by an individual against the state of which he is a national. Thus by
making application to Strasbourg, the individual may be able to overcome
obstacles placed in his path by national law.
Decisions of the Court on violations that arose directly from the state of
the law include Dudgeon v. United Kingdom (laws on homosexual acts in Nor-
thern Ireland held to infringe the right to respect for private life) 37 and Young,
James and Webster v. United Kingdom (enforcement of closed shop agree-
ment by British Rail leading to dismissal of three employees for refusal to join
the union).38 In that case, the government conceded and the Court declared
that the responsibility of the state for the violation was engaged since "it was
the domestic law in force at the relevant time that made lawful the treatment of
which the applicants complained." 39
Decisions of the Court have also concerned alleged violations caused by
judicial decisions. The best-known examples are The Sunday Times v. United
Kingdom (a decision by the House of Lords to uphold an injunction violating
34 See, e.g., Secretary of State for Education v. Tameside B.C., [1977] A.C. 1014;
Bromley B.C. v. Greater London Council, [1982] 1 All E.R. 129.
35 Galligan, supra note 2, at 261.
36 Supra note 16, at 32.
37 (1981), 4 E.H.R.R. 149.
38 (1981), 4 E.H.R.R. 38.
39Id. at 52.
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the freedom of expression)4° and the case of the Little Red Schoolbook,
Handyside v. United Kingdom.41 In that case a conviction and forfeiture order
under the Obscene PublicationsAct 195942 had been upheld on appeal, and the
European Court considered the outcome to fall within the "margin of ap-
preciation" allowed to national authorities in deciding whether a restriction on
freedom of expression was necessary for the protection of morals.
Violations of rights may also arise directly from the exercise of executive
power. The first decision of the Court in a United Kingdom case concerned the
Home Secretary's refusal to permit Golder, a convicted prisoner, to obtain
legal advice on a possible action against a prison officer for defamation. 43 This
refusal, authorized by statutory Prison Rules, 44 was held by the Court to
violate Article 6(1) of the Convention, on the ground that access to the courts
was guaranteed, and Article 8 (unjustified interference with correspondence).
In law, the Home Secretary's refusal could have been challenged in an English
court as an improper use of his discretion under the Prison Rules; alternatively,
the Rules themselves could have been challenged as ultra vires. It is most
doubtful, however, whether such a challenge would have been successful at
that time. Significantly, the same Prison Rules have recently been held ultra
vires by the House of Lords on the ground that the Prison Act 195245 did not
authorize interference with a citizen's right of access to the courts.4 6 In 1978,
executive action of a different kind, in-depth interrogation of detainees in
Northern Ireland, was held by the European Court to amount to inhuman and
degrading treatment, contrary to Article 3 of the Convention; 47 the methods of
interrogation were also plainly unlawful by the law of Northern Ireland, and
liability to compensate the victims was accepted by the United Kingdom
government.
48
Other cases involving executive or administrative action which have come
to the Commission in recent years (not all from Britain) have concerned the
refusal by prison authorities to register a prisoner's religion 49 or to allow a
prisoner to marry,50 the refusal by registration authorities to register the new
sex of a transsexual, 5 ' the refusal by a consul to make known to a citizen the
address of his former wife,5 2 the failure of the ministry of health to give ade-
quate warning to the parents of young children about the risks of vacci-
nation,5 3 the reorganization of secondary schools,5 4 the refusal of legal aid and
40(1979), 2E.H.R.R. 245.
41(1976), 1 E.H.R.R. 737.
42 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 66.
43 Golderv. U.K. (1975), 1 E.H.R.R. 324.
44 Prison Rules, 1964, S.I. No. 388.
4515 & 16 Geo. 6 and 1 Eliz. 2, c. 52.
46Raymondv. Honey, [1983] A.C. 1.
47Republic ofIrelandv. U.K. (1978), 2 E.H.R.R. 25.
48 For some cases see Donnelly v. U.K. (1975), 4 Decisions and Reports of the
European Commission on Human Rights (hereinafter D.&R. E.C.H.R.).
49Xv. FederalRepublic of Germany (1977), 11 D.& R.E.C.H.R. 55.
50Hamerv. U.K. (1979), 4E.H.R.R. 139.
51Xv. Federal Republic of Germany (1977), 11 D.&R.E.C.H.R. 16.
52 XV. U.K. (1977), 9 D.&R.E.C.H.R. 103.
53AssociationXv. U.K. (1978), 14 D.&R.E.C.H.R. 31.
54X& Yv. U.K. (1977), 11 D.&R.E.C.H.R. 147.
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birth certificates to a band of gypsies, 55 an order banning an insurance com-
pany from accepting fresh business, 56 an education authority's refusal of
permission to a Moslem teacher to attend worship on Fridays, 57 and a claim
for compensation for noise generated by a motorway and airport.58 In a recent
case from Sweden the European Court had to decide whether approval for ex-
propriation and a ban on redevelopment maintained for a long period over
land in Stockholm were in breach of the Convention. 59 Such cases are very like
the kinds of case that arise within the administrative law of many European
states. In principle, the possibility of judicial review of such cases already ex-
ists in national law. 60 Whereas a national court or tribunal will apply its own
domestic criteria of legality, for the Commission and Court at Strasbourg
what matters is compliance with the Convention. Although the two processes
may sometimes produce widely differing results, it will be suggested below that
the two levels of supervision have much in common in addition to subject
matter.
The rule requiring exhaustion of domestic remedies before recourse to
Strasbourg will be discussed below. That rule is not so extreme that theoretical
rights of judicial review have to be exhausted. Accordingly, applications con-
cerning executive action may go directly to Strasbourg without judicial review
having been sought in British courts. Other applications may go to Strasbourg
having already failed in proceedings in British courts. Thus foreign scien-
tologists who were refused permission to stay in the United Kingdom failed in
their challenge to the Home Secretary's decision in the English courts, and also
failed in their attempt at Strasbourg to challenge the decision to withdraw
recognition of the scientology college as an educational establishment.
61 So too
the Moslem teacher refused permission to attend worship during his employ-
ment failed both in the English Court of Appeal against his employers and in
the Commission against the government. 62 An application arising out of a
telephone tapping case that failed in the High Court was declared admissible
by the Commission. 63 In this case Sir Robert Megarry, Vice-Chancellor, had
held that tapping was not unlawful where there was nothing, such as trespass,
to make it unlawful, and that English courts could not recognize any rights
created by the Convention. It is certain that the European Court will apply dif-
ferent criteria and will decide whether the status of telephone-tapping in
English law conforms to the Convention's own requirements of legality. 64
Scrutiny of national law by the Commission and the Court has already
had dramatic consequences in revealing areas of executive action where (for
5 48 Kalderas Gipsies v. Federal Republic of Germany and Netherlands (1977), 11
D.&R.E.C.H.R. 221.
56Kaplan v. U.K. (1982), 4 E.H.R.R. 64.
57Ahmadv. U.K. (1981), 4E.H.R.R. 126.
58Arrondellev. U.K. (1980), 19 D.&R.E.C.H.R. 186.
59 Sporrong and Lonnroth v. Sweden (1983), 5 E.H.R.R. 35.
60 Sporrong and Ldnnroth, supra note 59, where one issue was whether Swedish ad-
ministrative law provided adequate judicial review of the decisions in question.
61 Schmidt v. Home Secretary, [1969] 2 Ch. 149; and 12 European Yearbook 306,
criticized by Jacobs, supra note 23, at 148.
62Ahmad v. L.L.E.A., [1978] Q.B. 36; and Ahmad v. U.K. (1981), 4 E.H.R.R.
126.
63Malonev. U.K., [19791 Ch. 344, 4E.H.R.R. 330.
64In view ofKlass v. FederalRepublic of Germany (1978), 2 E.H.R.R. 214.
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one reason or another) the general principles of administrative law have failed
to provide adequate protection. Standard accounts of administrative law tend
to avoid the problem of unequal application of principles of review. Narrow
legal explanations of the problem are likely to be inadequate. As Galligan has
said, "different judicial policies prevail in different areas of public power."
65
Two areas where legal protection has been inadequate are prisons and
mental hospitals. Numerous individual applications to the Commission come
from those detained in such institutions. The controlling techniques of ad-
ministrative law appear to have been used lightly in respect of powers affecting
individual liberty. In 1982, Wade wrote "The writ of habeas corpus plays a
part, though not a large one, in administrative law, since some administrative
authorities and tribunals have powers of detention."66 Until recently,
however, few administrative lawyers examined the extent of these powers and
the legal control over their exercise. In this they were following the lead of the
judges. In Arbon v. Anderson it was held that neither the Prison Act nor the
rules made thereunder were intended to confer any rights upon prisoners; 67
and in Becker v. Home Office Lord Denning M.R. said, "If the courts were to
entertain actions by disgruntled prisoners, the governor's life would be made
intolerable. The discipline of the prison would be undermined. The Prison
Rules are regulatory directions only. Even if they are not observed, they do not
give rise to a cause of action."168 Such a state of affairs was not confined to
English law, 69 but that particular judicial outlook seems to be becoming a
thing of the past, in the face of the remarkable progress made in the last ten
years in Britain by the prisoners' rights movement. 70 To mention two of the
most notable decisions: in R. v. Board of Visitors of Hull Prison, ex p. St.
Germain the Court of Appeal established that the supervisory jurisdiction of
the High Court extended to the disciplinary powers of prison boards of visitors
and thus that these boards could be required to observe natural justice. 71 In
Raymond v. Honey,72 a convicted prisoner, said the House of Lords, in spite
of his imprisonment, retains all civil rights which are not taken away expressly
or by necessary implication. 73 In the area of prison administration, the Con-
vention has been and continues to be a strong and positive influence on
English judicial attitudes. 74
6 5 Supra note 2, at 263.
6 Wade, Administrative Law (5th ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982) at 540. The
author's comment at 541 that in general the courts protect personal liberty "jealously
and effectively" by habeas corpus is not borne out by recent British experience. Cf. note
83, infra.
67 [1943] K.B. 252.
68 [1972] 2 Q.B. 407 at 418.
69 See Jackson, Justice Behind the Walls: A Study of the Disciplinary Process in a
Canadian Penitentiary (1974),12 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1, esp. 56 n.
70 See e.g. Zellick, Prisoners' Rights in England (1974), 24 U.T.L.J. 331; Tetten-
born, Prisoners' Rights, [1980] P.L. 74; Halsbury's Laws of England (4th ed.), vol. 37,
1982, Paras. 1101-1300.
71 [1978] Q.B. 678.
72 Supra note 46.
1 Citing the Hull case, supra note 71, Solosky v. R. (1979), 105 D.L.R. (3d) 745 at
760. For other recent cases see Halsbury's, supra note 70.
74From Golder, supra note 43, onwards to Silver v. U.K. (1980), 3 E.H.R.R. 475
and infra note 135.
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The situation is somewhat similar with respect to mental patients,
although it may be doubted whether English judicial attitudes were ever as
strongly opposed to mental patients' rights as they were to prisoners' rights.
The decision of the High Court to grant habeas corpus to a mental defective in
R. v. Board of Control, exp. Rutty75 led to the release of over 3,000 patients
who had been detained in a similar manner, and contributed to the reform of
the law made by the Mental Health Act 1959.76 That Act created mental health
review tribunals with power to decide on the discharge of civilly committed pa-
tients, but with power only to advise the Home Secretary on the discharge of
patients whose detention had been ordered by a criminal court to be subject to
restriction. According to Gostin, since the 1959 Act was passed there have
been no reported cases where the courts have been willing to examine the
substantive justification of a detention or have ordered the patient's
discharge. 77
The powers and procedures created by the 1959 Act came under scrutiny
by the European Commission and Court in X v. United Kingdom,78 X's ap-
plication to the Commission being brought after he had unsuccessfully
challenged his detention in the English High Court. In Winterwerp v.
Netherlands the European Court had previously laid down minimum condi-
tions for the detention of persons of unsound mind under Article 5(1)(e) of the
Convention, 79 but had left open the question whether the review by a national
court of the lawfulness of a detention covered substance as well as procedure.
X v. United Kingdom arose out of the exercise by the Home Secretary of his
discretionary power to recall a convicted offender who three years previously
had been released from a secure hospital. The European Court held that the
habeas corpus application that X had made after his recall did not enable the
English High Court to make due inquiry into the existence of the substantive
grounds for detention. The European Court also found that where detention
took place in England by means of the exercise of statutory discretion, the
scope of review was largely governed by the terms of the Act and did not ex-
tend to the merits.
As a direct result of that decision, the Mental Health (Amendment) Act
198280 included provisions designed to bring English law into line with the
Convention's requirements: in particular it enlarged the power of mental
health review tribunals in the case of restricted patients such as X, from merely
advising the Home Secretary to making the actual decision. 81
A further area of governmental power which directly affects individual
liberty arises from the Immigration Act 1971.82 Even though the United
75 [1956] 2 Q.B. 109.
76 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 72.
77 Gostin, Human Rights, Judicial Review and the Mentally Disordered, [1982]
Crim. L.R. 779 at 788.
78(1981), 4 E.H.R.R. 188.
79 (1979), 2 E.H.R.R. 387. The case law under the Convention is fully discussed by
Gostin, supra note 73.
10C. 51.
81 Prospects for the 1982 Act, now consolidated in the Mental Health Act, 1983, c.
20 are discussed by Peay, Mental Health Review Tribunals and the Mental Health
(Amendment) Act, [1982] Crim. L.R. 794.
12C. 77.
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Kingdom has not ratified the fourth Protocol to the Convention, which
precludes a state from expelling or refusing to admit its own nationals, many
individual applications have gone to Strasbourg from would-be immigrants
and members of their families. For present purposes, it is sufficient to refer to
recent uncertainty about the extent of judicial review which is available by
recourse to habeas corpus in the case of those who seek permission to enter the
country or are detained with a view to their deportation. At least until a deci-
sion by the House of Lords in 1983, it seemed that habeas corpus had ceased to
be an effective remedy for reviewing Home Office decisions regarding the
status of illegal entrants.8 3 In Caprino v. United Kingdom the Commission had
accepted as admissible a complaint that English law did not afford adequate
review of an Italian's detention in connection with a deportation order; but in
its final report the Commission took the view that Caprino should have used
the remedy of habeas corpus, even though it was "open to dispute" whether
habeas corpus would always be sufficient for the purposes of Article 5(4).84 If
such uncertainty in this branch of law continues (the case-law has been said to
be riddled with contradictions),85 this will continue to generate problems for
Britain under the Convention. It is ironic that it may be the Strasbourg
authorities who are requiring the British judges to reassume their historic role
as protectors of individual liberty.
An area of public power which has not received systematic attention from
an administrative law viewpoint is that of police powers in enforcing the
criminal law. Police powers have usually been studied in the context of civil
liberties and criminal procedure, although judicial review has sometimes been
sought in questions concerning the legality of police action. Such instances in-
clude the review of prosecution policies8 6 and the banning of public proces-
sions under the Public Order Act 1936.87 The police do not have a monopoly
of law enforcement powers, and discretionary decisions by government
departments in enforcing the law may raise rights issues. 88 By contrast, the
regulation of business and industry and the exercise of disciplinary powers
over professions and occupations frequently give rise to actions seeking
judicial review, but legal protection of the individual is relatively
83 R. v. Home Secretary, ex. p. Zamir, [1980] A.C. 930, has now been significantly
overruled by Khawaja v. Home Secretary, [1983] 1 All E.R. 765, discussed by Nedwick,
Habeas Corpus: Zamir to Khawaja, [1983] P.L. 213. On the earlier position, see
Newdick, Immigrants and the Decline of Habeas Corpus, [1980] P.L. 89, and British
Institute of Human Rights, The Habeas Corpus Act, is it becoming less effective? (Lon-
don: n. pub., 1980).
84 (1978), 12 D.&R.E.C.H.R. 14 and (1980), 22 D.&R.E.C.H.R. 5.85 De Smith, supra note 2, at 600. And see Sharpe, The Law of Habeas Corpus (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1976) chs. 2-6.86 R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, exp. Blackburn, [1968] 2 Q.B. 118; R.
v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, exp. Blackburn (No. 3), [1973] Q.B. 241; R. v.
Chief Constable of the Devon and Cornwall Constabulary, ex p. Central Electricity
Generating Board, [1981] 3 All E.R. 826.
87See Kent v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, The London Times, 15 May
1981 (wide ban on processions upheld).
88Inland Revenue Commissionersv. Rossminster Ltd., [1980] A.C. 952.
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underdeveloped in regard to such matters as privacy8 9 and parental rights in
the state educational system. 90
It is now proposed to examine more closely some aspects of the Conven-
tion that have a special application to administrative law.
V. ADMINISTRATIVE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS, AND THE
RIGHT TO AN INDEPENDENT TRIBUNAL 91
In 1961, the Whyat Report examined a wide range of discretionary deci-
sions taken by British government departments for which there was no appeal
to a tribunal. It considered that the individual is in principle entitled to have an
impartial adjudication of his dispute with authority unless there are overriding
considerations which make it necessary, in the public interest, that the minister
should retain responsibility for making the final decision. 92 New tribunals have
been established since 1961, but the Whyatt principle of impartial adjudication
for all discretionary decisions has never been accepted by successive govern-
ments. Article 6(1) of the European Convention contains a provision which
potentially could establish that principle in Britain. However, in the light of
the complex jurisprudence which now exists, it is unlikely that the develop-
ment will in fact go so far as to judicialise all discretionary decisions. Because
of differences in the French and English texts of the Convention, both versions
of the first sentence of Article 6(1) need to be read:
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
Toute personne a droit A ce que sa cause soit entendue 6quitablement, publique-
ment et dans un d~lai raisonnable, par un tribunal ind~pendant et impartial, 6tabli
par la loi, qui d~cidera, soit des contestations sur des droits et obligations de
caractire civile, soit du bien-fond6 de toute accusation en matire p~nale dirig~e
contre elle.
[The second sentence of the paragraph requires that judgments be pronounced
publicly, and sets out various exceptions to the rule of publicity.]
[Emphasis added]
With their experience of the expression "property and civil rights" in sec-
tion 92 of the Constitution Act 1867,93 Canadian lawyers will not be surprised
that difficulties have been met in the interpretation of the phrases underlined.
Elsewhere in the Convention (in Article 5 and the rest of Article 6) detailed
guarantees are given for the individual's right to due process of law in criminal
matters, but the words quoted give the sole guarantee for a just trial and an in-
dependent judiciary in non-criminal matters (except for matters related to loss
of liberty, where Article 5(4) is also relevant). At its broadest, "civil rights and
obligations" could refer to all rights and obligations other than criminal
89 Supra note 63.
90 Consider Campbell and Cosans v. U.K. (1982), 4 E.H.H.R. 293 in relation to
such decisions as Watt v. Kesteven C. C., [1955] 1 Q.B. 408 and Cumings v. Birkenhead
Corporation, [1972] Ch. 12. Parental rights have been increased by Education Act, 1980
and Education (Scotland) Act, 1981.
91 For a full discussion, see Harris and Boyle, supra note 24. And see Fawcett,
supra note 23, at 120-60; Jacobs, supra note 23, at 76-111; and Castberg, supra note 23,
at 111-26.92 Whyatt, The Citizen and the Administration: the Redress of Grievances (Lon-
don: Stevens & Sons Ltd., 1961) 27.
93 30 Vict., c. 2.
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charges. At its narrowest, it might be confined to matters regulated by le droit
civil. An intermediate interpretation is to distinguish with a broad brush be-
tween public law and private law and to hold that "civil rights and
obligations" should be confined to the latter. The droit civil and private law
interpretations would each mean that due process of law would not be
guaranteed in many areas of governmental power that directly affect the legal
position of individuals. The private law interpretation could present special
difficulty for the United Kindgom and Ireland, since the common law tradi-
tion eschews a formal distinction between public and private law. 94 Whichever
approach prevails, there will be difficulty in promoting uniform minimum
standards across a score of jurisdictions that have no consistent classification
of law amongst themselves.
The general approach under the Convention appears to be that "civil
rights and obligations" refers broadly to matters of private law and not public
law. The concept is autonomous and not determined by the practice of any ex-
isting legal system. Article 6(1) has been applied to disputes about parental ac-
cess to children, a worker's rights to holidays and sick pay, negligence by a
hospital or prison doctor, the wrongful dismissal of a state teacher and
(because of the impact on property rights) questions concerning the valuation
of land subject to expropriaton. Article 6(1) has been held not to apply to
disputes about taxation and social security, war pensions, claims under na-
tionality and immigration laws, extradition, bail applications 95 and matters
concerning the status of civil servants and members of the armed forces. But
what of public powers that directly affect private rights?
The leading decision of the Court on administrative matters is Ringeisen
v. Austria, where Article 6(1) was held to apply to decisions taken by a
regional commission under legislation which required official consent for the
transfer from one private person to another of land for development. 96 The
Court reasoned that for Article 6(1) to apply it was not necessary for both par-
ties to the dispute to be private persons, nor was it decisive that the giving of
consent was subject to Austrian administrative law. What mattered was that
the regional commission's decision to grant or withhold consent was decisive
for the relations in civil law between the contracting parties. Applying Article
6(1) to the facts, the court held that there had been no breach, since the
regional commission was a tribunal within the meaning of the Convention; it
was independent of the executive and of the parties, and the proceedings
before it conformed to the necessary procedural guarantees.
In this decision, the Court deliberately took a wider approach than the
majority of the Commission, whose opinion was that "civil rights and obliga-
tions" referred to relationships between private individuals, to the exclusion of
legal relations in which the citizen is confronted by the exercise of public
authority; the Commission did not consider that Article 6(1) had been intend-
ed to lay down minimum standards for judicial review of administrative ac-
tion.
94But see Article 18 of the Anglo-Scottish Treaty of Union 1707, which gave a
degree of protection to Scots law based on the distinction between "laws concerning
public right, policy and civil government, and those which concern private right": on
which see Gibson v. LordAdvocate, [1975] S.L.T. 134. And see, supra note 9.
95 See, e.g., Neumeisterv. Austria (1968), 1 E.H.R.R. 91.
96 (1971), 1 E.H.R.R. 455 and see Harris, supra note 24.
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In a more recent decision, Sporrong and Lonnroth v. Sweden, the Court by a 12-7
majority held that an owner whose land was adversely affected by an approval for
expropriation and a ban on development was entitled by Article 6(1) to have ques-
tions of domestic law regarding the legality of those measures decided by a court or
tribunal.
97
In Ringeisen's case, the private law contract was enforceable only if
public consent was given to the land transfer, and there was an obvious public
law intrusion into the private law of freedom of contract. Did it follow that all
public powers of regulating private activities were thereby brought within Arti-
cle 6(1)?
Two subsequent Court decisions, Konig v. Federal Republic of Ger-
many98 and Le Comte and others v. Belgium99 were concerned with regulation
of the practice of medicine. In the first case, Konig's licence to run a private
clinic had been withdrawn and later his practising certificate had been cancell-
ed, on each occasion by decision of a public law authority. Konig had
challenged each decision in the administrative courts and his complaint to
Strasbourg was of the excessive length of the procedure in those courts. The
European Court refused to decide the application of Article 6(1) by reference
to the classification of these disputes in German law, and considered that both
running the clinic and the practice of medicine involved rights of a private
nature, though these rights were subject to supervision in the public interest.
On the merits, the Court held that both in respect of the clinic and the practis-
ing certificate, the administrative court proceedings had been unreasonably
delayed.
In the second case, Le Comte and two other doctors were suspended from
practising medicine by a disciplinary tribunal of the medical profession. The
Court held that Article 6(1) applied since the dispute over the suspension
decisively affected the private right to practise medicine. The Convention did
not require each stage in the Belgian procedure to be conducted before a
tribunal meeting the requirements of Article 6(1). The right to judicial deter-
mination of the dispute covered questions of fact as well as questions of law,
and in this instance the right was met by taking together both the Appeals
Council of the medical profession (dealing with questions of fact) and the pro-
ceedings before the Cour de Cassation, concerning issues of law. The Appeals
Council and the Cour de Cassation each satisfied the test of independence and
impartiality, but the Court held that there had been a breach of Article 6(1)
since the Appeals Council had by its usual practice heard the applicants in
private and had refused their request for a public hearing. An earlier decision
of the Court, Engel v. Netherlands, had concerned disciplinary proceedings
within the armed forces. 100 The Court had held that although disciplinary pro-
ceedings in general fell outside Article 6(1), the nature of particular penalties
might render it necessary for the proceedings to be supervised as if they con-
cerned criminal charges. The majority of the Court in Le Comte ruled that
disciplinary proceedings could also come within Article 6(1) where they led to a
dispute (con testation) over "civil rights and obligations." 101
97 Supra note 59.
98(1978), 2 E.H.R.R. 170.
99 (1981), 4E.H.R.R. 1.
100 (1976), 1 E.H.R.R. 647.
101And see Sporrong and Lonnroth, supra note 59.
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These decisions of the European Court leave open the question whether
rights and obligations in public law may yet be brought within Article 6(1). To
date, the approach has been to bring public law procedures within Article 6(1)
by virtue of their effect on the private law rights and obligations of the in-
dividuals concerned. A further point is that Ringeisen, Konig and Le Comte all
concerned decisions taken by tribunals, courts and other bodies with a judicial
character. How far, if at all, does Article 6(1) apply to a decision taken by a
government department or other body which in its personnel and procedure
may be very far from having the character of a court or tribunal?
In Kaplan v. United Kingdom 10 2 the Secretary of State for Trade imposed
an order restricting an insurance company from taking on new business, after
an administrative procedure in which notice had been given and Kaplan's
representations had been considered. The Commission held that such a restric-
tion order affected the company's rights and obligations within Article 6(1)
since the company had a right to conduct insurance business; but further held
that Article 6(1) did not apply to the acts of an administrative body like the
Department of Trade exercising such powers. The Commission justified its
decision by the argument that an initial decision to impose restrictions was not
the "determination" of civil rights and obligations. A "determination" would
be made within Article 6(1) only when a dispute (contestation) arose through
the individual seeking judicial review of the administrative decision. In the
Commission's view, Article 6(1) entitled Kaplan to seek judicial review (a mat-
ter that was not contested by the British government) but not to a fresh discre-
tionary decision on the merits. The Commission said, "It is ... almost a cor-
ollary of the grant of discretionary powers, that the scope of judicial review of
the relevant decisions is limited." 103 Article 173 of the EEC Treaty was cited to
illustrate the limited scope of judicial review typical in the administrative law
of many European states.
According to one British comment, "At best the distinction drawn in
Kaplan is a convenient but somewhat arbitrary and artificial way of excluding
executive and other administrative bodies from the immediate ambit of Article
6(1) when there is nothing resembling a lis interpartes." 104 If the Commission
had held that the company was entitled to a decision by a court or tribunal on
whether the facts justified the restriction, this would have been tantamount to
barring government departments from exercising powers vested in them. The
common law doctrine of natural justice does not go to that extreme. But
Kaplan may not be the last case in which there is pressure for further
judicialization of the administrative process. It must also be remembered that
in any event Article 6(1) does not apply to those many administrative decisions
which concern the granting of benefits rather than the imposition of restriction
upon private activities. The European Convention has yet to experience its
Goldberg v. Kelly. 105
Two further comments may be made. First, it would appear both from
Kaplan and from Sporrong and Ldnnroth v. Sweden that it would violate Arti-
cle 6(1) for national authorities to seek to exclude judicial review of ad-
102 (1980), 4 E.H.R.R. 64, as discussed by Boyle, supra note 24.
103 (1980), 4 E.H.R.R. 64 at 89.
104 Boyle, supra note 24, at 223.
10s 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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ministrative decisions concerning "civil rights and obligations." While the
claim to foreign compensation which was the subject matter of Anisminic Ltd.
v. Foreign Compensation Commission10 6 might have been outside Article 6(1),
the property rights involved in expropriation cases such as Smith v. East Elloe
R.D. C. 107 and in R. v. Secretary of State, exp. Ostler 08 would fall within it. In
those two cases, the English courts upheld as absolute statutory clauses ex-
cluding judicial review after a six week period during which there was a right to
seek review. At Strasbourg, the six week right to sue would undoubtedly be a
material consideration in favour of the exclusion clause; but what of the posi-
tion where that period has expired before the individual has the possibility of
finding out that there were grounds for review (as in the Smith and Ostler
cases)?
Secondly, many administrative tribunals in Britain (for example, the
Lands Tribunal, rent assessment committees, and industrial tribunals) exercise
jurisdiction which falls within Article 6(1). They are subject to the supervision
of the Council on Tribunals and, since the Franks Report 1957, have been ac-
cepted as forming part of the machinery for adjudication rather than being ap-
pendages of government departments. Their continuing independence and im-
partiality are now also subject to protection under Article 6(1). In Zand v.
Austria, the Commission concluded that, while the Federal Minister of Justice
had power to delineate the districts of the Austrian labour courts, this did not
deprive them of their independence provided that the judges were irremovable
during their term of office. 109
While Article 6(1) provides for scrutiny of the independence and impar-
tiality of tribunals, it also requires hearings to be held and decisions given in
public. For these reasons it has been suggested that a more flexible guarantee
for administrative justice would be preferable. 110 In another recent decision,
the Commission declared admissible a Dutch application concerning the
withdrawal of a licence for a liquid gas installation: this application called into
question the adequacy and impartiality of the procedure by which the Dutch
Council of State had given its advice on the matter. 111 In its report in Campbell
andFell v. U.K., the Commission held that the boards of prison visitors which
impose disciplinary penalties on prisoners are not "independent and
impartial" tribunals, since they do not have the necessary independence of the
prison administration; Article 6(1) is also violated because the boards sit in
private and legal representation is excluded." 2 In September 1983 these mat-
ters were under consideration by the Court.
In regard to the loss of liberty it is particularly important to set minimum
standards of judicial procedure and to prevent their erosion by administrative
considerations. Under Article 5 the decision of a court is required both for a
conviction leading to a detention (Article 5(1)(a)) and when a detainee
106 [1969] 2 A.C. 147.
107 [1956] A.C. 736.
108 [1977] Q.B. 122.
109 (1978), 15 D.&R.E.C.H.R. 70. And cf. Petzold, The European Convention on
Human Rights in theAustrian Constitutional Court (1974), 46 B.Y.I.L. 401.
10 Harris, supra note 24.
1 Benthem v. Netherlands, application 8848180, not yet reported, Oct. 20, 1982.
112 (1983), 5 E.H.R.R. 207.
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challenges the legality of his detention (Article 5(4) ). But the decision to re-
mand an accused person in custody or to release him on bail may be made by
"a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power" (Article
5(3) ). In Schiesser v. Switzerland, the Court held by a majority that a district
attorney had sufficient independence of the executive to make such a decision
in a case in which he was not acting as public prosecutor: in Swiss law the
district attorney was subordinate to the Department of Justice and the chief
public prosecutor, but in practice no instructions as to the exercise of his
discretion in particular cases were given to him. 113 A similar test of defacto in-
dependence was applied in Delcourt v. Belgium, where a member of the Pro-
cureur G~n6ral's department had attended the private deliberation of the Cour
de Cassation on a criminal appeal. 114 But in De Wylde v. Belgium, three per-
sons detained as vagrants were held to have suffered a violation of Article 5(4):
the magistrate who ordered their detention, while a "court" from an organiza-
tional point of view and independent both of the executive and the parties, did
not in vagrancy cases follow a procedure which satisfied the guarantees of
judicial procedure in criminal matters. 115 Similarly in Winterwerp v.
Netherlands the Court held that the Dutch authorities had failed to provide for
an independent decision on the necessity for the continued detention of a men-
tal patient; and that to satisfy Article 5(4) in the case of mental patients, not
only must the deciding authority be a court in organizational terms and enjoy
due independence, its procedure must also be of judicial character and the in-
dividual must have a fair hearing.'1 6 In X v. United Kingdom, recall by the
Home Secretary of a convicted prisoner to a secure mental hospital was plainly
an administrative decision; while a mental health review tribunal might in
terms of status and procedure be regarded as a "court" under Article 5(4), the
tribunal's powers were in law purely advisory and it could not order release of
the prisoner. 17
Decisions such as these in respect of criminal procedure and the loss of
liberty could be drawn upon in future interpretation of Article 6(1). They in-
dicate a flexible rather than a rigid notion of a court (the French text
throughout uses tribunal, whereas the English text uses variously court and
tribunal), but nonetheless seek to maintain a definite distinction between
judicial and administrative decisions.
In one important respect the Court has been prepared to read down the
scope of Article 5(4), which guarantees to one deprived of his liberty the right
to have the lawfulness of this detention decided speedily by a court. Where the
decision to detain is taken by a court at the close of judicial proceedings, the
Court has held, in an obiter dictum, that there is no further right of recourse
under Article 5(4) "since the supervision required by Article 5(4) is incor-
113 (1979), 2 E.H.R.R. 417.
114 (1970), 1 E.H.R.R. 355. Cf. Piersackv. Belgium (1983), 5 E.H.R.R. 169.
115 (1971), 1 E.H.R.R. 373.
116 (1979), 2 E.H.R.R. 387.
117(1981), 4 E.H.R.R. 188. See also the following decisions by the Commission:
Eggs v. Sw'land (1978), 15 D.&R. E.C.H.R. 35. chief military prosecutor not a court;
Christinet v. Sw'land (1979), 17 D.&R. E.C.H.R. 35, return of habitual offender to
prison eleven years after court decision; Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium (1979), 17
D.&R. E.C.H.R. 59, 4 E.H.R.R. 443, recidivist's repeated detentions by executive deci-
sion, following court decision placing him at the government's disposal.
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porated in the decision." The Court has emphasized that this is conditional on
the procedure followed having a judicial character and giving the individual
due guarantees. 118 In view of this condition, a judge's decision to order some-
one's detention would not satisfy Article 5(4) where he acts on impulse and
without any consideration of the limits of his power, as in the English case of
Sirros v. Moore. 19 In that case, Sirros was released on habeas corpus pro-
ceedings nine days later, but failed to recover damages for his unlawful deten-
tion because of the Court of Appeal's view that judicial immunity applied
equally to judges of superior and inferior courts. Since the detention of Sirros
was in plain breach of Article 5(l)(f), Article 5(5) would give him an en-
forceable right to compensation, yet judicial immunity bars personal liability,
and vicarious liability on the part of the Crown is excluded by the Crown Pro-
ceedings Act 1947.120 On somewhat similar facts, in a case from Trinidad and
Tobago, a majority in the Privy Council awarded damages against the govern-
ment of Trinidad and Tobago, relying upon a constitutional provision that
guaranteed redress to those whose fundamental rights had been infringed. 121
Compliance in Britain with Article 5(5) of the European Convention would
seem in such cases to require legislation: reliance on the Crown making an ex
gratia payment would not satisfy Article 5(5).
VI. LEGALITY, DISCRETION AND REMEDIES
There are three other aspects of the Convention which will be considered
from the viewpoint of administrative law.
A. "Prescribed by law" (prdvu par la loi)
The Convention provides in a number of articles that a restriction or
limitation on a guaranteed right is justifiable if it satisfies certain criteria.
These criteria include the requirement that the restriction is "prescribed by
law." Thus in Article 5(1) arrest or detention of a person is justified "to secure
the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law." In Article 8 interference
by a public authority with the right to respect for private life, home and cor-
respondence must be "in accordance with the law" (privu par la loi). Restric-
tions on the freedom of expression must be "prescribed by law" (Article
10(2) ). By these requirements, the Convention seeks to exclude arbitrary in-
terference with the guaranteed rights. According to Fawcett, "prescribed by
law" suggests specific provisions imposed by law, usually in statutory form. 122
In the case of tribunals required to be established by law, this "plainly pro-
hibits the establishment of extraordinary courts by mere executive order." 123
In the case of powers of search, however, Fawcett considered that the require-
ment of "in accordance with law" would accommodate a general power of
police search, without warrant or specific statutory authority.124 On the ques-
118De Wildeetal. v. Belgium (1970), 1. E.H.R.R. 373 at 407.
119119751 Q.B. 118.
120 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 44.
2 1 Maharajv. A.-G. of Trinidad, [1979] A.C. 385.
122 Fawcett, supra note 23, at 74.
" Id. at 159. Cf. Zand v.Austria, supra note 102.
124Fawcett, supra note 23, at 194.
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tion of how conformity to law is decided, Jacobs concluded that the Commis-
sion and the Court must accept the interpretation of national law adopted by
the national courts, for the reason that questions of municipal law are, for the
Convention organs, questions of fact. 12S But subsequent cases involving the
United Kingdom suggest that the Court and the Commission prefer to apply
their own standards of legality.
In Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, the Court held that the common
law basis of contempt of court in England did not prevent the issuing of an in-
junction to ban publication of a newspaper article being "prescribed by law,"
provided (a) that the law was reasonably accessible, in the sense that a citizen
could obtain an indication of the applicable legal rules, and (b) that the rules
in question were formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to
decide his course of action, or at least he must be reasonably capable of
foreseeing the consequences of given action. On the facts of the case, these re-
quirements were met. 126
But if the common law of contempt satisfied the test, two important areas
of state action have come under review at Strasbourg. In English law the legal
basis for telephone tapping is doubtful. Such doubt was not dispelled by the
Birkett Committee's reasoning in 1957: "It is difficult to resist the view that if
there be a lawful power to intercept communications in the form of letters and
telegrams, then it is wide enough to cover telephone communications as
well."1 27 In Malone's case128 Sir Robert Megarry's judgment rested in part on
the proposition that tapping was not lawful when there was nothing such as
trespass to make it unlawful. He further considered that it was for Parliament
and not the courts to lay down new rules of law to regulate such a complex
field. However, the government later decided that legislation on telephone tap-
ping was not desirable and made changes in the arrangements for reviewing the
operation of telephone tapping.129 When Malone's case reached Strasbourg,
the Commission declared the complaint admissible: given the extent to which
the system for the interception of communications was regulated by ad-
ministrative arrangements rather than by rules of law, an important question
arose as to whether tapping was "in accordance with the law." " 0
The censorship of prisoners' correspondence also gave rise to the question
whether what passes for legality in the United Kingdom satisfies the standards
set under the Convention. In Silver v. United Kingdom, the Commission held
that such censorship must, under Article 8(2), be in accordance with the law.
In a significant passage, the Commission stated the phrase "in accordance
with the law" was not merely a reference to a state's domestic law, "but also a
reference to the rule of law, or the principle of legality, which is common to
democratic societies and the heritage of member states of the Council of
125 Jacobs, supra note 23, at 196-97.
126 (1979), 2 E.H.R.R. 245 at 270-73.
127 Report on Interception of Communications (London: H.M.S.O., 1957) Cmnd.
283.
128 Supra note 63.
129 Home Office, The Interception of Communication in Great Britain (London:
H.M.S.O., 1980) Cmnd. 7873.
130 (1981), 4 E.H.R.R. 330 at 348.
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Europe." 131 Although the Prison Act 1952132 and the Prison Rules 196433
were accessible, censorship was essentially based on detailed rules contained in
unpublished standing orders. These were considered by the Commission to be
lawful within Article 8(2) only so far as the restrictions they imposed could be
deduced from the terms of the enacted legislation. A wide variety of restric-
tions contained in the standing orders failed this test and was therefore
declared to be in breach of Article 8. Even before the case reached the Court,
the government's response was to make and publish a new standing order con-
taining revised censorship rules. 134 However, when Silver's case reached the
Court, the Court did not accept an argument for the prisoners that the rules
for the censorship of letters had all to be published and must have the force of
law. The Court doubted whether in this field it would be "possible to for-
mulate a law to cover every eventuality." Rules made under wide discretionary
authority were acceptable, provided that the citizens affected had sufficient
knowledge of their content to foresee the consequences of certain action. On
this basis, some but not all of the censorship rules were held to be "in accord-
ance with the law." 
135
In another censorship case, the Commission found that the power of
British customs to open mall from abroad was in accordance with the law,
since it was exercised under a scheme contained in delegated legislation which
did not go beyond the possibilities envisaged by the parent Act. 136 The require-
ment of "prescribed by law" thus helps to ensure that an exercise of power
that might infringe the guaranteed rights should be carried out on the basis of
enacted law rather than of secret, unpublished administrative rules. The view
of Jacobs mentioned above that the Commission and the Court must simply
accept the interpretation of national law adopted by the national courts137 has
been overtaken by events. It is, however, a matter for regret that the Court in
Silver's case did not make greater inroads into the fortress of executive discre-
tion by requiring all operative rules for prison censorship to be published and
to have the force of law. Seldom can Fuller's second way of failing to make
law (that is, a failure to make available to the affected party the rules he is ex-
pected to observe) have been more aptly illustrated than by the facts in Silver's
case. 138
B. Supervision of the exercise of national discretion
In regard to the conduct of civil or criminal trials which are alleged to
have been unfair, the Convention organs have often adopted what is known as
the "fourth instance" doctrine, resisting the pressure from applicants simply
to enter into the merits of a judgment or a conviction. The need for this can be
readily understood, although to a common law lawyer this does seem
sometimes to be carried to an excess, given the less satisfactory features of
131(1980), 3 E.H.R.R. 475 at 498.
132 Supra note 45.
133 Supra note 44.
134 See Zellick, Prisoners'Rights, [1981] P.L. 435.
135 Silvery. U.K., not yet reported, Mar. 25, 1983.
136Xv. U.K. (1978), 16 D.&R. E.C.H.R. 32.
137 Supra note 23.
13 Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964) at 33-41.
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foreign procedure.13 9 The Court has more than once stressed that the
machinery established by the Convention is subsidiary to the national systems
for safeguarding human rights.140 In Handyside the Court declared that the
Convention allows a margin of appreciation, given both to the legislator and
to the national authorities that interpret and apply the laws.'14 Moreover,
phrases in the Convention such as "within a reasonable time" and "necessary
in a democratic society" allow for wide discretion both in their interpretation
by national authorities and in their application by the Court and Commission.
In a recent immigration case, the Commission emphasized that its task was
that of a "subsidiary organ of control" - not to take the place of the national
authorities but to review whether in the exercise of their functions those
authorities acted outside what might reasonably be expected of them under the
Convention. 142 But as Silver's case showed, when the Commission and the
Court scrutinized the record of prison censorship very closely indeed, the pro-
cess of review may be so detailed as to amount to taking again decisions that
the national authorities had made.14
3
One test that is applied in this process is that of proportionality, derived
from German public law and the decisions of the European Court of Justice.
As explained by the Court in Handyside, any interference with the freedom of
expression must be "proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued." The test of
proportionality is a means of reviewing the executive's own assessment of what
a particular situation requires, and if that seems excessive, substituting a dif-
ferent opinion. But to apply the test of proportionality does not exclude the
margin of appreciation. 144 Proportionality has been claimed to resemble the
test of reasonableness as a ground for judicial review of discretion in English
law: but it is certainly not open to the interpretation of unreasonableness as an
abstract issue of vires, which is one possible interpretation of the leading
English decision, A.P. Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation.145
C. Remedies
It is only possible to mention some aspects of the complex law of the Con-
vention related to remedies. In keeping with the view of the Convention as a
system of control subordinate to national legal systems, Article 26 requires
that "all domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the generally
recognized rules of international law" before the Commission can deal with an
application. This question is usually dealt with when the Commission is con-
sidering the admissibility of an individual petition. 146 The doctrine of exhaus-
"" Consider the astonishing decision in X v. Belgium (1979), 16 D.&R. E.C.H.R.
200, where the right of an accused person to examine witnesses against him (Art. 6(3))
was denied by the admission of seriously prejudicial hearsay evidence.
140 See, e.g., Belgian Linguistic Case (No. 2) (1968), 1 E.H.R.R. 252 at 296.
141 (1976), 1 E.H.R.R. 737 at 754.
142Kamalv. U.K. (1980), 20 D.&R.E.C.H.R. 168.
143 See also Bonnechauxv. Switzerland(1979), 18 D.&R.E.C.H.R. 100.
144See, e.g., Wiggins v. U.K. (1978), 13 D.&R.E.C.H.R. 40 (law in Guernsey re-
quiring occupation of houses to be subject to licence) and Rassemblement Jurassien v.
Switzerland (1979), 17 D.&R.E.C.H.R. 93 (threat to public order justifying interference
with freedom of assembly).
145 [1948] I K.B. 223.
146 See discussion in Jacobs, supra note 23, at 40-51, and Mikaelsen, European Pro-
tection of Human Rights (Germantown, Md.: Sijthoff & Noordhoff, 1980).
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tion requires only that applicants make use of existing national remedies that
are capable of providing an effective and sufficient means of redress; pro-
ceedings need not be taken nor rights of appeal exercised if there is no
reasonable chance of success. in Donnelly v. U.K.,147 in proceedings brought
by individual applications challenging the interrogation methods used against
I.R.A. detainees, the Commission laid down criteria for deciding whether the
detainees could have been expected to bring actions for damages in respect of
their unlawful treatment. In the circumstances of Northern Ireland, the Com-
mission concluded that the domestic courts were capable of dealing effectively
and impartially with the various claims for compensation.
As regards administrative law remedies, it will depend very much on the
circumstances of a case whether exhaustion is required. Where a person com-
plained of decisions taken by the Danish Ministry of Justice but failed to seek
review in the administrative court, her application was held not admissible.148
The same was held when an English solicitor complained of a decision by the
Law Society but had not sought judicial review. 149 In the Commission's view,
the procedure was clearly available even though the scope of review was
disputed. But an applicant was not required to appeal to the Court of Appeal
in Guernsey where no similar case had ever been taken to the courts before.150
Certiorari was not considered an appropriate remedy to deal with an alleged
error of fact by the (British) Immigration Appeal Tribunal, since it was not be-
ing claimed that the tribunal had made a decision on the facts which no
reasonable authority could have made. 51 Nor was certiorari considered an ef-
fective remedy for disciplinary punishment imposed by a prison governor in
connection with the I.R.A. "dirty protest,"' 152 the Commission noting that in
R. v. The Board of Visitors of Hull Prison, ex p. St. Germain,153 which had
established that boards of visitors were subject to certiorari, doubts had been
expressed as to whether the remedy would lie in respect of a governor's
disciplinary decisions.
In Caprino v. United Kingdom, where an Italian complained of his deten-
tion pending deportation, the Commission decided that while the detainee was
entitled by habeas corpus to judicial review of the grounds for detention, the
scope of review was uncertain and might not be sufficient; nonetheless the de-
tainee was required to exhaust the remedy or show reasons why limited scope
of review by habeas corpus would not help him. 5 4 An individual will not be re-
quired to exhaust remedies where he shows that his attempts to complain have
been obstructed by the authorities. 155 Special rules apply in the case of in-
147 (1975), 4 D.&R.E.C.H.R 4, discussed by Boyle and Hannum, Individual Ap-
plication under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Concept of Ad-
ministrative Practice: the Donnelly Case (1974), 68 A.J.I.L. 440 and The Donnelly
Case, Administrative Practice and Domestic Remedies Under the European Convention
(1977), 71 A.J.I.L. 316; and seeX. v. U.K. (1980), 20 D.&R.E.C.H.R. 184.
148Xv. Denmark(1977), 11 D.&R.E.C.H.R. 169.
149Xv. U.K. (1981), 4 E.H.R.R. 350.
0SO Wiggins v. U.K., supra note 138.
151Kamalv. U.K. (1980), 4 E.H.R.R. 244.
152 McFeeleyv. U.K. (1980), 20 D.&R.E.C.H.R. 45.
153 Supra note 71.
154 (1980), 4 E.H.R.R. 97.
155Hilton v. U.K. (1976), 4 D.&R.E.C.H.R. 177. Reed v. U.K. (1979), 19
D.&R.E.C.H.R. 113.
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terstate applications, particularly where the complaint is of an administrative
practice incompatible with the Convention, that is, an accumulation of similr
breaches sufficiently numerous to amount to a pattern or system of which the
higher authorities in a state must be taken to be aware. 156
Comparison may be made between decisions such as Caprino, where the
scope of habeas corpus is examined for the purposes of the domestic remedies
rule, and the evaluation of habeas corpus that is made under Article 5(4) when
it has to be decided whether a detainee had access to a court decision on the
lawfulness of his detention. 157 Administrative complaints and other remedies
that may need to be exhausted under the domestic remedies rule are not,
however, relevant to questions arising under Article 5(4), since the provision
requires the decision of a court.
The domestic remedies rule is concerned with the requirement of exhaus-
tion, and imposes no obligation on states to see that remedies are available.
However, by Article 13, states are under an obligation to provide an effective
remedy for persons whose rights are violated. This controversial article has
been interpreted as requiring states to provide remedies for persons claiming to
be victims of a violation.158 Since the United Kingdom has not incorporated
the Convention in its domestic law, it is open to question whether the United
Kindgom is in a position to comply with Article 13, except where the remedy in
national law (for example, an action in damages for false imprisonment) coin-
cides with the obligations under the Convention (in this case Article 5(5) ).
Even where there is a substantial equivalence of remedy, the national rules of
liability may not be identical with the international duty to provide an effective
remedy. In particular, the special protection against liability afforded to those
acting under the Mental Health Act 1959159 by section 141 (no liability unless
bad faith or lack of reasonable care; prior leave of the court required to both
civil and criminal proceedings) could well obstruct an action for damages in
circumstances where a breach of the Convention may have occurred. 160
VII. CONCLUSIONS
First, as regards the role of law in a constitutional state, as outlined by
President Muller in the opening section, the Convention evidently contributes
to the protection of fundamental rights, but it also bears upon subjection of
sovereign power to law, which it tackles by creating international machinery
for reviewing the practice of national systems of government. At first sight the
emphasis in the Convention system on state responsibility might seem to
weaken the separation of powers within the state by pinning liability on the
government for every infringement of rights that occurs. But if the case law is
studied this is not the case, since the Convention attaches importance to the
156 Republic of Ireland v. U.K. (1978), 2 E.H.R.R. 25 and see McGovern, The
Local Remedies, Rules and Administrative Practises in the European Convention on
Human Rights (1975), 24I.C.L.Q. 119.
157AsinXv. U.K. (1981),4E.H.R.R. 188.
158 Klass, supra note 64, at 238.
159 7& 8 Eliz. 2, c. 72.
160 See Carter v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, [1975] 2 All E.R. 33 and c.f.
R. v. Bracknell J.J., exp. Griffiths, [1976] A.C. 314. See now Ashingdane v. U.K.
(1982), 4 E.H.R.R. 590 (did s. 141 bar rights under Articles 5(4) and 6(1)?)
[VOL. 21, NO. 4
European Convention on Human Rights
notion of judicial power and judicial independence, and prefers legislative to
executive rule-making.
Secondly, to a surprising extent there are points of comparison and
resemblance between administrative law and the Convention system. Thus a
central problem in administrative law - the extent to which the exercise of ex-
ecutive discretion may be reviewed - arises often under the Convention. So
too the extent to which the factual basis of executive decisions can be reviewed
appears in both systems. Under Article 5, for example, when individuals have
been detained as vagrants, mental patients or in connection with pending ex-
tradition or deportation, the question has arisen whether the Court and Com-
mission may review the findings of fact on which national decisions were bas-
ed. Again, the Convention provides a means of assessing the effectiveness of
national remedies in enabling there to be judicial review of executive decisions.
Remedies which the national system has to offer (such as habeas corpus) may
be too limited in scope to protect the individual's rights under the
Convention. 161 The liability of public authorities for a failure in a public ser-
vice may arise both in administrative law and under the Convention. 62
Similarly, the duty to give reasons for administrative decisions arises in both
systems; under the Convention this is linked to the individual's right to a
judicial decision on the lawfulness of his detention 163 and to his right to a fair
trial. Here again shortcomings in the present state of English law are exposed:
as the court said of the unsuccessful habeas corpus proceedings taken by the
applicant in X v. United Kingdom, "It is clear from the evidence that lack of
information as to the specific reasons for the recall, a matter almost exclusively
within the knowledge of the Home Secretary, prevent X's counsel, and thus
the Divisional Court, from going deeper into the question." 164
One comparison which is not dealt with in this article concerns locus stan-
di, for example, the interest which an individual must show before he can
challenge general laws that adversely affect him, 165 and the extent to which
representative organizations may initiate proceedings on behalf of their
members. 166 A comparison of a different kind may be made between the work
of the Parliamentary Ombudsman in reviewing the activities of a government
department when a citizen complains of excessive delay in the handling of his
affairs, and the work of the Court and Commission in reviewing the acts of na-
tional authorities when an applicant complains of excessive delay in the con-
duct of judicial proceedings affecting him. 167 The context and procedures may
be different, but broadly the same process of scrutiny and evaluation is at
work.
161 Supra note 157.
162 See, e.g., Artico v. Italy (1980), 3 E.H.R.R. 1 (Failure by government to take
positive action to ensure that A's right to criminal legal aid was effective.)
163 Supra note 157.
164 Id. at 212.
165 See, e.g., Klass, supra note 61, and Dudgeon, supra note 37.
166 Recent Commission decisions include National Federation of Self-Employed v.
U.K. (1978), 15 D.&R.E.C.H.R. 198 and Alliance des Belges v. Belgium (1979), 15
D.&R.E.C.H.R. 259.
167 See, e.g., Neumeister, supra note 88, and Konig v. Germany (1978), 2 E.H.R.R.
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The main reason for these resemblances must be that both under ad-
ministrative law and the Convention, the process is one of expostfacto review
of the policies, decisions and procedures of public authorities in the state. As
they develop experience in this process, the Convention organs are (whether
consciously or not) drawing far more upon the experience of national systems
of public law than upon the doctrines of customary international law. Thus the
requirement in Article 26 that exhaustion of domestic remedies should be "ac-
cording to the generally recognized rules of international law" gives limited
guidance to the Court and Commission in their present work, much of which is
very different from the classical operation of international law. Two further
lessons may be drawn for the United Kingdom from experience under the Con-
vention. First, that those who teach or practise i. domestic public law neglect
the Convention at their peril; secondly, that within domestic public law no gap
should be allowed to appear between administrative law and the law of civil
liberties.
To establish or explain these resemblances is not to say that the Conven-
tion system merely replicates the national system of public law. The strengths
and weaknesses of the Convention system are not identical with the strengths
and weaknesses of any one national system. There are political and diplomatic
reasons why the Convention organs may exercise an authority which is often
greater than that of national courts, but which may in some respects be less.
The international composition of the Court and the Commission should en-
sure that their decisions draw upon a broader experience than is possible
within a national court. It is difficult to believe that English courts alone
would have initiated the process of reforming the administrative law of the
prison system that has been inspired by the Strasbourg authorities. Just as the
Parliamentary Ombudsman may in one sense be said to have brought a "new
equity" into the control of administrative authorities, 168 so could the Conven-
tion system be said to have loosened the arteries of national public law, and to
have established a form of "public law litigation" not hitherto possible in the
United Kingdom. 169 Not all the Strasbourg decisions will stand the test of time,
but they provide a course of new principles, values and techniques (such as
proportionality) that may enrich national systems. In particular, so far as the
United Kingdom is concerned there is value in establishing certain rights and
freedoms as positive goods, and in laying to rest the merely residuary character
of rights and freedoms which is assigned them by British tradition. For exam-
ple, it seems fundamental to an understanding of Silver's case that at the
outset the Commission declared that a prisoner has the same right as a person
at liberty to respect for his correspondence.170 In another case of prison cen-
sorship, the House of Lords came remarkably close to this position in declar-
ing that a convicted prisoner, in spite of his imprisonment, retains all civil
rights which are not taken away expressly or by necessary implication.17'
161 discuss this in The Role of the Ombudsman in Relation to The Protection of
Citizens'Rights, [1980] C.L.J. 304 at 309-10.169 Cf. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation (1976), 89 Harv.
L.R. 1281 and Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court (1982), 96 Harv. L.R. 4.
170 This followed the Court's decision in Golder, supra note 43.
171Raymondv. Honey, [1983] A.C. 1.
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One practical objective of the Convention system is to enable attention to
be drawn to shortcomings in the national system of legal protection for the in-
dividual. In the field of criminal process, United Kingdom practice would
seem to stand comparison with that in many other European countries. 172 But
in the administrative law that governs the detention of prisoners and mental
patients, the exposure of weaknesses in the British system has already been
salutary. Developments at Strasbourg may stimulate administrative lawyers to
look again at such problems as executive discretion, bureaucratic secrecy and
the provision of compensation for those who suffer a failure of justice.
For reasons explained above, this article has not entered the constitutional
debate for and against the incorporation of the Convention within United
Kingdom law. On the basis of this selective survey of Convention practice, the
author considers that incorporation would be of value even without attempt-
ing to curb the legislative supremacy of Parliament. A statute of incorporation
should as a minimum require all those entrusted with statutory powers or
duties to have regard to the rights protected by the European Convention. 173
This would then enable the courts to review delegated legislation, ad-
ministrative policies and individual decisions for non-compliance with the
Convention. It would also be desirable to include a provision on the lines of
section 3 of the European Communities Act 1972,174 requiring the courts to
decide questions affecting the Convention in accordance with the principles
laid down by the Strasbourg Court. It would also seem necessary, so as to give
effect to Articles 5(5) (enforceable right to compensation) and 13 (effective
remedy before a national authority), to empower the courts to award compen-
sation where an individual's rights under the Convention had been violated by
executive or other subordinate action and where the law did not otherwise pro-
vide a remedy.
It may be argued that such limited incorporation would be worthless
unless the legislative supremacy of Westminster were also curbed, since a deci-
sion given by English courts applying the Convention to strike down a cherish-
ed executive practice could always be overridden by Act of Parliament. The
theoretical power of Westminster to legislate to this effect would indeed be
there; but it is doubtful whether a future government would be eager to in-
troduce legislation reversing a decision by British courts applying the Euro-
pean Convention unless it were at the same time willing to terminate United
Kingdom acceptance of the individual right of petition to Strasbourg and the
compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court. The possibility of express
reversal is not so remote that one can say in Lord Sankey's renowned words,
"but that is theory and has no relation to realities." However, it would be un-
fortunate if the perceived constitutional difficulty were to be a total bar to all
movement towards better protection of the individual in United Kingdom law.
172 See, e.g., supra note 139, and the delay cases, supra note 167.
173 Cf. European CommunitiesAct, 1972, c. 68, s. 2(2).
174C. 68.
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